Impact of environmental regulations on trade in the main EU countries: conflict or synergy? by de santis, roberta
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Impact of environmental regulations on
trade in the main EU countries: conflict
or synergy?
roberta de santis
Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat)
2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37756/
MPRA Paper No. 37756, posted 30. March 2012 13:34 UTC
 1 
           
 
 
 
                                    
 
 
	


  	 	 	
 		 	  	 
  	 	  	
  



	




     	 
       
      


   	 	  
   
             
          
 ! "# # $    % 
 
& 
  '   
  
   (    ) ('    **"
 + 
%      ,  
   





© '  ,  
     # 
    - .   
     .                 .      
  .           , +        
 , 
/   0  - .      
       1   
    ,     0 .          
    .     
  .     
.  %    - .  2  0   1        .  
    
  .     .  
  .   
    
    ,  
 ,    
      
 , 
 2 
Impact of environmental regulations on trade in the 
main EU countries: conflict or synergy? 
R. De Santis* 
 
 
Abstract 
In an increasingly integrated world with declining trade barriers, environmental regulations can have a 
decisive role in shaping countries’ comparative advantages. The conventional wisdom about 
environmental protection is that it comes at an additional cost on firms imposed by the government, 
which may erode their global competitiveness. However,  this paradigm has been challenged by some 
analysts. In particular, Porter (1991) argues that pollution is often associated with a waste of resources 
and that more stringent environmental policies can stimulate innovations that may over-compensate for 
the costs of complying with these policies. This is known as the Porter hypothesis.  
While there is a broad empirical literature on the impact of trade on environment the empirical literature 
on the impact of environmental regulations on trade flows is relatively scarce, very heterogeneous and 
presents mixed results.  The innovative feature of this paper is its attempts to estimate, in a gravity setting, 
the overall impact on 15 EU countries bilateral exports of three major Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (MEAs).   
 
According to our estimates, to be member of MEAs in 1988-2008 had a positive impact on EU15 exports 
ranging between 22 and 35%. Furthermore, it seems that the jointed membership of WTO/EU and MEAs 
had a further positive “interaction effect” on EU15 exports. These results show the presence of a synergy, 
at least for EU members, between environmental regulations and trade flows. It can be partly explained 
by a possible trade diversion effect with respect to countries that did not sign MEAs, and a corresponding  
trade creation effect among members of the environmental agreements.  
 
This explanation seems consistent with  the fact that the relevance of the relationship between MEAs, EU 
and WTO rules for enhancing mutual supportiveness of environment and trade has been clearly reflected 
in the international negotiations in the past twenty years.  
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Introduction  
Growing global interdependence, both economic and environmental, increases the need 
for coherence and coordination in trade and environmental policies. The European 
Union has been the central proponent of including environmental issues in trade 
discussions at the multilateral level and has made increasing efforts to integrate its trade 
strategy with the principles of sustainable development (and vice versa). This aspect is 
particularly evident in the recent Europe 2020 strategy. 
 
At present, there are over 250 multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) dealing 
with various environmental issues which are currently in force. About 20 of these 
include provisions that can affect trade. For instance, they may contain measures that 
prohibit trade in certain species or products, or that allow countries to restrict trade in 
certain circumstances. 
 
A question that may arise is whether measures under a MEA are compatible with WTO 
rules. For example, a multilateral agreement could authorize trade in a specific product 
between its parties, but ban trade in the same product with countries that have not 
signed the agreement. This could be found to be incompatible with WTO’s non-
discrimination principle known as “most favoured nation treatment”, which requires 
countries to grant equivalent treatment to the same (or “like”) products imported from 
any WTO member country. On the other hand, WTO rules do allow members to 
derogate from their obligations in some cases, for instance where a measure is aimed at 
the conservation of natural resources, provided certain conditions are met. 
 
The conventional wisdom about environmental protection is that it comes at an 
additional cost on firms imposed by the government, which may erode their global 
competitiveness. However,  this paradigm has been challenged by some analysts. In 
particular, Porter (1991) argues that pollution is often associated with a waste of 
resources and that more stringent environmental policies can stimulate innovations that 
may compensate for the costs of complying with these policies. This is known as the 
Porter hypothesis. It is worth to underline that empirical studies present mixed results.  
 
The innovative feature of this paper is its attempts to estimate, in a gravity setting, the 
overall impact on 15 EU countries bilateral exports of three major Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (MEAs).   
  
This paper is organized as follows. The first section conducts a critical survey of the 
most recent empirical literature, the second, the third and the fourth sections describe 
the empirical strategy, the equation and the dataset and the estimates results. 
Conclusions follow. 
1. A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE: CONFLICTS OR SYNERGIES? 
According to economic theory, the environmental regulations is not neutral with respect 
to trade flows. In fact, the environmental rules modifying the production cost curve, 
would determine a change in the comparative advantages. It is worth to underline, 
however, that the interaction between international trade and environmental policies 
could determine opposite effects on trade flows.  
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In the theoretical literature, most widely discussed is the “pollution haven - race to the 
bottom” hypothesis, which says that countries that are open to international trade will 
adopt looser standards of environmental regulation, out of fear of a loss in international 
competitiveness. This hypothesis was initially formulated in the context of local 
competition for investments and jobs within Federal States, where the decentralized 
environmental responsibilities gave each state independence in setting their 
environmental standards in line with their priorities. Most critics argue that increased 
competition for trade and foreign direct investment could lead to lowering of 
environmental standards and regulations. 
 
Less widely recognized, is the Porter hypothesis1stating that stringent environmental 
regulation does not necessarily deteriorate the industrial competitiveness of a country. 
Rather, stringent environmental policies – under the condition that they are efficiently 
designed and employed – can further a nation’s international competitiveness. 
 
While there is a broad empirical literature on the impact of trade on environment the 
empirical literature on the impact of environmental regulations on trade flows is 
relatively scarce, very heterogeneous and presents mixed results. One of the main 
problem is that most studies are incomparable to other ones with the consequence that 
results do not lead to a uniform conclusion. Mainly due to differences in model 
assumptions, methods employed and data used a comparison of results across studies is 
extremely difficult.  
 
The differences in study outcomes are mainly related to three factors2: i) different 
studies use different policy stringency indicators. These comprise input versus output-
oriented indicators, costs versus physical measures, objective (observed) versus 
subjective (self reported, expert judgemental) measures. ii) studies use different types of 
temporal data, iii), different methods are employed: simple statistical indicators or 
econometric studies; cross-section, time series or panel data econometric studies; and 
studies at country, State, firm or plant level. 
 
Among the papers comparable, using a gravity setting with OECD data3, the most 
significant studies are Van Beers and Van den Bergh (1997) that test the impact of 
environmental stringency on bilateral exports. They construct indicators of 
environmental stringency based mainly on energy intensities and recycling rates and 
                                                
1
Porter & van der Linde 1995. For a survey on empirical paper assessing  Porter hypothesis see Ambec 
S. ; Lanoie P.  (2007) 
2
 The following categorization of empirical studies illustrates the wide diversity of approaches:  i) trade-
in-goods (Tobey 1990, van Beers and van den Bergh 1997) versus factor content of trade (Xu and Song 
2000);  
ii)simple statistical indicators (Low 1992) versus (multivariate) regression models (Tobey1990, van Beers 
and van den Bergh 1997) or applied equilibrium modelling (Steininger 1999);  iii)multilateral trade flows 
(Tobey) versus bilateral trade flows (van Beers and van den Bergh); iv) single country (Low and Yeats 
1992, studies in Fredriksson 1999) versus multi-country or multiregion (Tobey, van Beers and van den 
Bergh, Xu and Song 2000); v) static (Tobey, van Beers and van den Bergh) versus dynamic (Bjørn et al. 
1997, Xu and Song);  vi) analysis at the individual firm level ( Bjørn et al.) versus sector level (all of the 
other studies mentioned in this list). 
3
 For an extensive survey see Jug and Mirza (2005). 
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rank OECD countries according to their stringency into a 0-1 index. Their main result 
confirms in a way the pollution haven hypothesis, since they come to the finding that 
the OECD countries’ exports are negatively and significantly affected by more stringent 
regulations. They also show that imports are negatively correlated with the importing 
country’s stringency, which does not support the pollution haven hypothesis.  

Harris et al. (2002) slightly modify Van Beers and Van den Bergh’s tests by adding-up 
exporters and importers’ fixed effects as well as time effects to show that the stringency 
variable does not confirm anymore the first findings. Grether and De Melo (2003) 
represent in a gravity setting stringency by a regulatory gap between countries, 
measured by difference in GDP per capita. However, when they control for different 
factors in their trade equation they conclude that the relationship between the regulatory 
gap and trade flows is not robust.  
 
2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
The aim of our empirical analysis is to estimate whether and how the interaction 
between WTO, EU and MEAs memberships exerted a significant impact on EU15 
exports in a gravity setting. 
In line with recent works, we augmented the gravity equation with a multilateral trade 
resistance index. Starting from Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), the inclusion of 
“multilateral trade resistance index” in empirical papers has been widely used to obtain 
a specification of a gravity equation that can be interpreted as a reduced form of a model 
of trade with micro foundations4. As for the empirical strategy, we use a panel data 
technique. A major motivation for this choice is the possibility to control for the 
correlated time invariant heterogeneity5. We perform an Hausman specification test to 
check the presence of correlation between explanatory variables and individual effects. 
Results are reported in table 1: the null hypothesis of zero correlation is rejected, 
                                                
4 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) developed a theoretical gravity equation by using a CES utility 
function.  Their basic gravity model is subject to: 
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where yW is the world income, country i’s world income share θi=yi/yW, and trade cost tij is a function of 
border effect bij and distance dij. bij =1 if there is no border barriers between country i and j, otherwise 
equals one plus the tariff equivalent of the border barrier between the two countries. The model says that 
the trade between country i and j is determined by the share of the multiplier of both countries’ income to 
the world income, as well as trade cost adjusted for the price indexes in both countries. The price index in 
country j is a function of the price indexes, income shares, and the trade costs of all countries.  
5
 OLS suffer from heterogeneity bias in a gravity setting. The two most widely used panel data models are 
the random effect model (REM) and fixed effect model (FEM): both can control for heterogeneity. Their 
assumptions are different. REM models require that unobserved bilateral effects are ~ n.i.i. and 
orthogonal to the remaining part of the error term. regressors have to be uncorrelated to individual effects 
and error term for all cross sections and time periods. If the orthogonality conditions hold, the REM 
provides more efficient estimates than FE estimators. If explanatory variables are correlated with 
unobserved individual effects FEM is consistent.  
 6 
showing that for our purposes FEM seems more reliable than REM6. However, FEM 
suffers from the major shortcoming of not being able to provide estimates of time 
invariant regressors.  
In order to overcome this problem we decided to use an Hausman and Taylor estimator 
(HT). HT method is a 2SLS random effect model that allows to deal with correlation 
between regressors and unobserved individual effects. Using an HT estimator it is 
possible to estimate parameters of time invariant regressors. 
The HT model in a bilateral form follows: 
 
 
Yijt = α0 + β1 X1ijt + β2 X2 ijt  + δ1 Z1ij + δ2 Z2ij + eijt    (1) 
 
eijt = µij + v ijt         (2) 
 
where α0 is the constant term, µij is the unobserved individual effect, v ijt is the white 
noise error term, X1 are the time-varying variables uncorrelated with µij; X2 are the 
time-varying variables correlated with µij; Z1 are time-invariant variables, uncorrelated 
with µij; Z2 are time invariant variables correlated with µij. 
µij is the part of eijt including all the bilateral characteristic not specifically 
modelled in X1, X2, Z1 and Z2. It includes also the unobserved trade resistance variables, 
both bilateral and country specific: 
 
µij = ηij  + ki + λ j + ωt         (3) 
 
where ηij are the bilateral specific effects, ki and λj are importer and exporter country 
characteristics, ω are time effects. 
The presence of X2 and Z2 causes correlation with unobserved individual effect. HT 
model uses variables already included in the model to instrument X2 and Z27. 
In the empirical literature there are different selection procedures to select the variables 
correlated with µij. It is possible to select instruments on the base of economic intuition 
(Hausman and Taylor (1981)) or following different procedures8.  
                                                
6
 The test statistic of 128.87 is greater than the chi-squared critical value with 11 degrees of freedom  
therefore the null hypothesis that the REM is consistent is rejected. 
7
 In details, X2 can be instrumented by deviation from the group means of X2; Z2 can be instrumented by 
deviation from the group means of X1The model is identifies as long as the number of variables in X1 is 
greater than the number of variables in Z2. 
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3. EQUATION AND DATASET 
The dependent variables in the estimates are the EU15 bilateral export flows. The 
equation is estimated for the EU15 countries as exporting countries and 25 countries 
(15EU members + 10 OECD) as trading partners; the time span is 1988-20089. 
We introduce three sets of variables into the gravity equation: i) standard gravity 
variables, ii) variables proxing multilateral trade resistance index iii) dummy variables 
for trade and environmental agreements10,  
i) Standard gravity variables. Bilateral distance, as a proxy of transport costs, and the 
product of the importer’s and exporter’s GDP as proxies of the “mass”.  
ii) Multilateral trade resistance index. To built a multilateral resistance index, price 
indexes are needed. However, price variables are not available for all the countries, 
especially for developing ones. Therefore, in the empirical literature, several methods 
have been implemented to proxy these trade resistance terms. The most widely used 
seems to be the inclusion of country specific dummies11. This method has the advantage 
to capture unobserved price effect producing consistent estimates of parameters. 
Feenstra (2004) shows that the inclusion of these dummies generates about the same 
results of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). Our empirical strategy follows these 
suggestions.  
In HT models country specific dummies appear in the error term. At the same time, the 
remaining components of µij (equation 3) proxies the unobserved trade resistance 
variables, both bilateral and country specific. We adopt a broad interpretation assuming 
that tij, is a log-linear function of observable variables12.  
iii) Trade and environmental agreements; 
The estimated equation form is the following: 
Ln EXPijt = b1LnMassijt  + b2 LnDistij + b3 Similijt + b4Fact ijt +b5 Z + b6 Kyotoijt + b7 
UNFCCCijt + b8 Montrealijt+ b9 WTOijt + b10 EUijt +eijt    (4) 
                                                                                                                                          
8  See for instance Walsh (2006) 
9 The dataset is taken by OECD (STAN DTB) for bilateral exports in value terms and environmental 
stringency indicators, World Bank WDI for GDP in US $ and population, WTO and MEAs membership 
are taken by WTO and OECD websites, distance is taken from 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
10
 We selected three major MEAs : Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol, since they include 
many trade related measures (see appendix) and have been signed by the EU. The dataset is available on 
request. 
11 Rose and van Wincoop (2001). 
12 Dummies for common language, shared borders, currency, islands countries, land area of exporter and 
importer, See Marques H, and J. Spies (2006), Melitz (2005), Subramanian and Wei (2003), Rose (2002). 
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where: 
i) Ln is the natural logarithm, i is the exporting country, j is the importing country 
and t is the year 
ii)  EXPijt  is exports in value from country i to country j;  
iii) MASSijt  is the product of the gross domestic product of the exporting and 
importing countries, a proxy of the “mass”, i.e. the size of the countries involved in 
bilateral trade; 
iv) Distij  is the great circle distance between i and j13; this formula approximates the 
shape of the earth as a sphere and calculates the minimum distance along the surface. 
v) Similijt is the similarity index of the two trading partners’ GDP as a measure of 
relative country size; it is built as: 
Ln
2 2
1 jtit
it jt it jt
GDPGDP
GDP GDP GDP GDP
    
 
− − 	  	 	  	+ + 
  
  
 
vi) Factijt: it is the absolute difference in relative factor endowments between 
country-pairs; it is built as: 
	






−	






jt
jt
it
it
POP
GDPLn
POP
GDPLn
 
where POP is the population. 
vii) Z is a vector of dummy variables capturing bilateral characteristics i.e. dummies 
for common language, shared borders, currency, islands countries, land area of exporter 
and importer. 
viii) WTOijt is a dummy that assumes value 1 if the importing country j liberalizes its 
imports under the WTO and at the same time the exporting country i is a WTO member. 
ix) Kyotoijt, UNFCCCijt  and  Montrealijt are dummies that assumes value 1 if the 
exporting and importing countries have signed respectively  the Kyoto, UNFCCC and 
Montreal agreements and 0 otherwise. 
x) EUijt is a dummy that proxies the EU internal market integration process. 
Therefore, EU membership has been a dynamic process, with European countries 
joining the EU in different years, this dummy assumes value 1 when both countries 
were members . 
We expect that bilateral export flows are positively influenced by: i) the product of 
importing and exporting countries’ GDP. In gravity models trade flows are positively 
influenced by the “mass” proxied by the product of GDP. ii) The WTO and the “EU 
                                                
13 To calculate great circle distances you need the longitude and latitude of the capitol or “economic 
center” of each economy in the study. The apply the following formula to obtain the distance measure in 
miles: Dij = 3962.6 arccos([sin(Yi) · sin(Yj)] (6)+ [cos(Yi) · cos(Yj) · cos(Xi − Xj)]),where X is longitude 
in degrees multiplied by 57.3 to convert it to radians and Y is latitude multiplied by −57.3 (assuming it is 
measured in degrees West).  
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membership”: countries joining EU and WTO should have benefited from declining 
trade barriers. 
.We expect that bilateral export flows are negatively influenced by: i) distance. 
According to the standard gravity model, bilateral distance is a proxy for transport costs 
and cultural proximity between two countries. 
We have no a priori on: i) the signs of the MEAs: a negative sign of the index favours 
the pollution haven . On the contrary, a positive sign supports Porters’s 
hypothesis; ii) the signs of the relative country size index (Simil). A negative sign of the 
index favours the classical Heckscher- Ohlin- Samuelson trade theory view that trade 
rises with relative factor endowment differences. On the contrary, a positive sign 
supports Linder’s hypothesis, which states that trade volumes are smaller the more 
dissimilar two countries are in terms of relative factors.  
4. ESTIMATES RESULTS: IS ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION A SECONDARY TRADE BARRIER? 
We estimated our equation (4) through an HT estimator. As we have stressed in section 
2, in this kind of model the choice of variables correlated with residuals is crucial. We 
tested in the estimates several variables potentially correlated with unobserved 
individual effects. The choice of the feasible set of instruments depended on the 
deviation of the estimates from FEM estimates.14 The basic idea was that the lower the 
gap with FE estimates, the lower the correlation of the independent variables with 
residuals. 
To test the appropriateness of the choice of variables correlated with unobserved 
individual effect, we performed a Hausman-Taylor over-identification test based on 
comparison between the HT and Within estimators. 
We identified HT115 as our preferred version: the mass, bilateral distance, the similarity 
index and the borders were the most important sources of correlation between 
explanatory variables and unobserved specific effects. The HT over-identification test 
did not reject the hypothesis of legitimacy of our choice of instruments. 
The estimates results are summarised in Table 1. As regards “gravity standard” 
variables, a positive export relationship with the mass and a negative one with distance 
is confirmed, in line with the findings in the empirical literature. The control variables, 
not reported in the table, are statistically significant and with the expected signs. 
                                                
14 FEM results were taken as benchmarks: the within estimator is a consistent estimator of parameters, 
controlling for any source of correlation between regressors and unobserved individual effects.  
15
 Several HT specifications were implemented in order to select the appropriate instrumental variables 
we selected HT1 with the following: instruments (Simil, lndist, lnmassa, border) . 
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As in Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermeier (2003), the signs and statistical significance of 
Similijt and Fact ijt seem to support the Linder hypothesis: bilateral trade is higher the 
more similar two countries are in terms of factor endowments and country size.16  
Table 1. The impact of trade agreements and MEAs on EU15 import flows  
 Hausman-Taylor N. of  obs: 5698 
N. of bilat. relat. 286 
 
 Time sample 1988-2008 
 within GLS HT1 
Ln Massijt 0.40*** 0.29***     0.41*** 
LnDISTij  -0.75*** 0.11 
Similijt 1.11*** 0.20  1.11*** 
Fact ijt -0.13*** -0.05* -0.13*** 
EUijt 0.15*** 0.20*** 0.15*** 
WTOijt 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.27*** 
UNFCCCijt 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 
Montrealijt 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 
Kyotoijt 0.27*** 0.36*** 0.28*** 
Costant 10.4*** 19.13*** 8.6*** 
  1128.87***  
F test  F(11, 5339)= 
551.02*** 
  
	 !"#   2.94** 
Regressors in Zij included but with unrecorded coefficients: 
*** significant at 1% , ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
The three MEAs dummies have positive and significant coefficients, rejecting the 
hypothesis of pollution haven17. In fact, according to our estimates the average positive 
variations of exports (of EU 15 towards OECD countries) induced by signing UNFCCC, 
Kyoto and Montreal agreements are respectively 22, 32 and 35%, over the period 1988-
2008. It can be partly explained by a possible trade diversion effect with respect to 
countries that did not sign MEAs, and a corresponding  trade creation effect among 
members of the environmental agreements.  
We also find a positive and significant relationship between EU and WTO memberships 
and bilateral exports. Similarly to the related empirical literature18, our results show that 
                                                
16
 This hypothesis was resumed by Helpman and Krugman (1985). They asserted - using a model derived 
from a standard monopolistic competition framework- that the theory behind comparative advantages (i.e. 
the Heckscher-Ohlin model) does not predict the relationships in the gravity model. Deardoff (1998) 
suggested that the basic gravity model can be derived from H-O, and so too can the Linder, Helpman-
Krugman hypothesis. Reconciliation is provided by Evenett and Keller (2002) who find that “factor 
endowments and increasing returns explain different components of the international variation of 
production patterns and trade volumes”. 
17
 Since the coefficient of the dummy UNFCCC is 0.20, the variation of exports induced by signing this 
agreement (UNFCCC=1) with respect to the case of not signing (UNFCCC=0), is given, other things 
being equal, by [(exp0.20*1/ exp0.20*0) –1]*100=22%. 
18Rose (2002), Subramaian and Wei (2003), De Santis and Vicarelli (2007). 
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the WTO membership dummy is positive and statistically significant. EU countries 
exported about 31% more towards WTO members than towards other countries. As for 
the EU membership, the impact is more limited (16%) than that for WTO membership. 
Nevertheless, this result is consistent with the tight trade links characterizing the EU 
members also before the creation of the European Union 19.  
We included in our regression interaction terms between our trade and environmental 
agreements dummies (table2). With the inclusion of these terms, the estimated 
coefficients indicated the difference in effects of the regressors (EU or WTO 
membership) on the dependent variable (EU15 bilateral exports) between countries that 
had signed MEAs and those that had not. 
Table 2. Interaction effects 
 
Interestingly, with respect to the interaction with the EU membership, we found a 
positive and significant coefficient only between the EU membership and the Kyoto 
agreement. This shows that, for EU members, the effect of having signed the Kyoto 
agreement on bilateral trade was higher (by the amount of the estimated coefficient). As 
for the WTO membership we found positive and significant coefficient for the 
UNFCCC and Kyoto agreements. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Estimates show that EU15 bilateral export flows were positively influenced by the 
presence of both trade and environmental agreements in the period 1988-2008. This 
evidence seems to show that, at least for EU members, on average, the environmental 
regulations did not constitute a secondary trade barriers in the past twenty years. 
According to our estimates, to be member of MEAs in the period 1988-2008 had a 
positive impact on EU15 exports ranging between  22 and 35%. Furthermore, it seems 
that the jointed membership of WTO/EU and MEAs had a further positive “interaction 
effect” on exports.  
These results reject the pollution haven hypothesis in favour of a view à la Porter, at 
least for EU members. This is in line with the fact that the relevance of the relationships 
between MEAs, EU and WTO rules for enhancing mutual supportiveness of 
environment and trade has been clearly reflected in the international negotiations in the 
past twenty years.  
                                                
19
 Trade relationships within Europe have always been intense because of cultural and neighbourhood 
factors and they have been reinforced over the past decades by several partially overlapping policy 
decisions. 
 Coeff.  Coeff. 
UNFCC*EU 0.01 UNFCC*WTO 0.25*** 
Montreal* EU 0.06 Montreal* WTO 0.98 
Kyoto* EU 0.14*** Kyoto* WTO 0.32*** 
 12 
We also find a positive and significant relationship, in line with the existing literature, 
between EU and WTO membership and bilateral exports: EU countries exported about 
31% more towards WTO countries and 16% more towards EU members. The lower 
impact of EU membership is consistent with the historically tight trade links 
characterizing the economies in Europe also before the creation of the European Union. 
 13 
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